An eviction ban protects tenants and, by design, removes a landlord’s main remedy. During the pandemic, England suspended evictions and extended notice periods while arrears built - and the cashflow hit landed on landlords who then carried it into a higher-rate world. The company landlords most affected are exactly the ones GalimAI maps. This study reads the strain from that proprietary view.
What GalimAI’s own data reveals
A cashflow shock is invisible in headline statistics but specific in GalimAI’s data. Across the 463,022 property-owning companies and more than 1,000,000 owners it maps, each carries its financing and distress signals - so the geared company landlords least able to absorb months of unpaid rent, then a refinancing wall, are identifiable rather than aggregated.
That is the unique value. Our own analyses surface the cohort: the most heavily-leveraged owners for whom an income gap is dangerous, those under bridging-finance pressure, and the dissolutions our data tracked as strained letting companies were wound up. GalimAI’s regional distress map shows where this concentrates.
For a funded buyer that is the edge: the company landlords whose pandemic cashflow hit became lasting strain - the most likely sellers - are a reachable list of named owners in GalimAI.
What changed: a suspension of possession
Under the Coronavirus Act 2020, notice periods for possession were extended between 26 March 2020 and 30 September 2021 (rising to four months for much of that time), and the enforcement of most evictions was suspended between 17 November 2020 and 31 May 2021.
Arrears built up behind that protection. A think-tank estimate put around 756,000 households behind on housing payments; the National Residential Landlords Association found 7% of private tenants had built pandemic arrears (18% of them owing more than £1,000), and that 60% of its landlord members had lost rental income.
The public backdrop
The public picture is a temporary, well-intentioned suspension that left a backlog of unpaid rent and a cohort of landlords carrying it. What the public data does not show is which company landlords absorbed the hit, how leveraged they were, and whether they recovered. That is the connection GalimAI’s map makes.
The most plausible mechanism
Removing the ability to recover possession, while income fell, hit landlord cashflow; for highly geared owners that gap is dangerous, and it compounded with the 2022-23 rise in mortgage costs. Distress therefore concentrates in the most leveraged company landlords. We present this as a strong correlation with a clear mechanism, not proof that the ban alone explains any single failure.
Sources
The proprietary figures in this study (the 463,022 companies, 1,000,000+ owners and the distress signals) are GalimAI first-party data. The public background figures are drawn from:
- House of Commons Library - coronavirus: support for landlords and tenants
- House of Lords Library - Covid-19: housing evictions
Frequently asked questions
What does GalimAI's own data add here?
It names the strained landlords. GalimAI maps 463,022 property companies and 1M+ owners with live distress signals, so the geared company landlords that absorbed the pandemic cashflow hit and carried it into the rate-rise era are identifiable rather than aggregated.
What was the Covid eviction ban?
Under the Coronavirus Act 2020, possession notice periods were extended (26 March 2020 to 30 September 2021) and enforcement of most evictions was suspended between 17 November 2020 and 31 May 2021, while arrears built up.
How big was the arrears build-up?
Estimates put around 756,000 households behind on housing payments; the NRLA found 7% of tenants in pandemic arrears (18% owing over 1,000 pounds) and 60% of landlords losing rental income.
How can investors use this?
The company landlords whose pandemic cashflow hit became lasting strain - the most likely sellers - are a reachable list of named owners in GalimAI.